I.
A major concern of economic historians since World War II has been to interpret the process of industrialisation in now developed countries.
Anglo-American economic historians have formulated a major part of their inquiry in the following way.
" . the Industrial Revolution poses two problems:
(1) why did this first breakthrough to a modern industrial system take place in Western Europe? and (2) why, within this Europea experience, did change occur when and where it did?" 1 Indeed Hartwell has severely criticised an earlier generation of writers for being too preoccupied with matters of equity and the quality of life during industrialisation at the expense of explaining England's primacy;
"The most lively literature has been concerned with the way of life and the standard of living during industrialisation, i.e. with the consequences of the industrial revolution, and the important problem of determining why the revolution occurred at all, and why it occurred in England, i.e. with the causes of the industrial revolution, has not received its warranted attention.-,
A sizeable number of authors have recently examined an even more specific question, namely 'why did England experience the onset of the industrial revolution before France?' Thus Davis defines his central issues as follows:
"In examining development in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, the questions must be asked whether it exhibits features that explain the great discontinuity of the Industrial Revolution that was about to occur; and whether it reveals the reasons why the Ind tr . I Revolution came to Britain and not to France.
Crouzet goes on to argue that this method of inquiry is a fruitful one in terms of yielding insights into the process of economic growth:
"The economic historian interested in the key problem of growth is bound to find the comparative approach particularly fruitful. A systematic comparison of the eighteenth-century English economy with that of another country -and France as the leading Continental power at that time seems the obvious choice -should bring out more clearly what factors were peculiar to England and might have determined what is a unique phenomenon, the English Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century." (4 ) There is by now an extensive literature offerring a wide variety of answers to these questions.
To cite just a couple of examples from the very many explanations for England's primacy we find views as diverse as those of Kemp, "... if one overriding reason can be given for the slower transformation of the continent ... it must be the continued prevalence of the traditional agrarian structures." (5) and Hagen, "... differences in personality rather than differential circumstances are the central explanation of Britain's primacy ... the Industrial Revolution occurred first in England and Wales ... because British peo le were inwardly different from those of the continent.
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However, there has been an increasing tendency in the literature to abandon the search for a single crucial reason for the occurrence of the industrial revolution in England in the eighteenth century. For example Milward and Saul maintain, "All these attempts to isolate single factors which can explain the fact that the first industrial revolution occurred where it did ... tend to break down before the enormous diversity of the continental economies.
The more their history in the eighteenth century is considered, the greater appears the difficulty of finding one single factor, in the British economy not present in some continental economies." 7)
In reaction against the single factor explanation two positions have commonly been adopted.
One is to regard the English industrial revolution as the result of a previous period of general economic growth;
thus Hartwell argues "... do we need an explanation of the industrial revolution? Could it not be the culmination of a most unspectacular process, the consequence of a long period of slow economic growth? ... Cannot the industrial revolution be explained more plausibly as the outcome of a process of balanced growth?"(8)
The other is to list a large number of favourable factors, as, for example, does Kranzberg, "In short, there was no single factor which can account for Britain's leadership in the Industrial Revolution. Instead, it was a multiplicity of factors -technological, social, economic, political, and cultural -which came together in the mid-18th century to provide the stimulus for industrial advance. In all these factors, Britain had a slight advantage over France.
But the advantage was qualitative rather than quantitative."(9)
Neither of these positions is very satisfactory and Milward and Saul attacked them also in their recent book.
On the former they "The French industrialisation process resembles (without being identical with) that of Britain because they both commence at a very early stage, and proceed more or less apace, of course with some important differences in detail ... Economic history has, I believe, so long mis-interpreted French industrialisation because it has for so long been accustomed to looking at modern economic growth through the prism of the English experience ... industr~a~~sation proceeded differently in the two countries."
Both Roehl and O'Brien and Keyder are arguing that the economic history of France, in English at least, has been seriously distorted by the general adoption, epitomised in particular by Landes and Rostow, of an erroneous perspective of a uniform path of industrialisation with
England as the front runner and the other countries following behind on the same course.
The present paper advances four propositions.
(i) The standard question 'why was England first?' cannot be answered.
(ii) It is in any case one which is misconceived. Failure to do so may be the source of some of the difficulties encountered in the review of the literature.
The fundamental line of argument underlying all these propositions is that economic development in general and technological progress in particular in eighteenth century Europe should be regarded as stocbaeric processes.
II.
To aid our examination of the difficulties of the explanation of England's primacy the question will be put in the more specific form found in the literature, 'why did the onset of the industrial revolution occur in England and not France?'.
'Industrial revolution' will be understood as a period of rapid structural change in the economy, involving a rapid rise in industrial output, the share of output in manufacturing and factory based activity, (implying a different kind of economy), based on major technological innovations.
For present purposes we can adopt a narrow definition of the explicandum.
It is a commonplace to give the cotton textile industry the leading role in precipitating industrial revolution, although not the whole growth process. (15)
Landes does so because it met the following specifications;
"On the one hand, industrial revolution required machines which not only replaced hand labour but compelled the concentration of production in factories -in other words, machines whose appetite for energy was too large for domestic sources of power and whose mechanical superiority was sufficient to break down the resistance of the older forms of hand production.
On the other hand, it required a big industry producing a commodity of wide and elastic demand, such that (1) the mechanisation of any one if its processes of manufacture would create serious strains in the others, and (2) the impact of improvements in this industry would be felt throughout the economy." ( 16) Rostow concurs and sees a lack of other contenders, hypothesising However, it is helpful to formulate the problem in this way.
First it serves to remind us that some of the as, (the partial derivatives), could be negative; putting it in the context of England's primacy it could be that some of the features of the English economy cited as favourable to industrialisation because they were present in England could actually have been retardative. "Previous centuries of development determined that the industrial revolution happened, not in Europe's wealthiest, most populous, most powerful and most productive country, France, but in an island off its shores.", (italics added). (23 ) Unfortunately, given the difficulty of dealing with the unique event, it may be that this contention that the result demonstrates the superiority has led, as Hagen puts it, to a situation where In other words the favourability of certain conditions in England has been inferred from the result with the likelihood that entails of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.
A different reaction would be to argue that the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable were genuinely stochastic in the sense that randomness rather than ignorance is involved and that the independent variables are related to'the dependent variable probabilistically in the true structure. This would imply that even with all the relevant explanatory variables, X 1 ... X present in the regression there would still be an error term, representing the 'irreducible random'.
This view seems to have no supporters at all in the recent debate over the causes of the industrial revolution. As Davis, one of the few to have contemplated such a view, says, -----"It could be argued that no explanation is needed. The events that were decisive were two in number; the invention of the spinning jenny by Hargreaves, and of the water frame by Arkwright ... These two isolated events may have been fortuitous; the chance of personalities and their good fortune in seeking along the right lines. But the economic ~~(25) historians instinctively recoils from such explanations.
Perhaps this is partly because at first sight the idea of randomness has connotations of 'lottery' and the abandonment of the idea that there were any functional relationships, i.e. in terms of the regression model this would mean that all the Ss were zero and there would be only 'noise'.
This, of course, is not implied by making the second reaction.
All that need be maintained is that there are probability distributions of values of Y for given values of any X and that the probability distributions of Y are different for different values of X.
That is to say that the S coefficients would be non-zero and could be interpreted as giving information about the partial effect of an independent variable on the expected waiting time to the 'decisive innovations'.
Such a view of history in general has recently been proposed by
Leff;
"To any practising historian it must be the first principle from which he begins that events happen which need not happen and which could frequently have happened differently. Their contingency varies from sheer chance and accident such as Barbarossa's death by drowing to a precarious equilibrium between forces ..."~2 6) If this is how the industrial revolution is looked at, then the following warning by Leff must be heeded; "To read back ... from the outcome of a sequence of events causal antecedents into i is the most vulgar of all historical errors ...''(27~ So this second view would maintain that it may be, but need not be, that England was superior (inferior) to France in terms of the probability of achieving the 'decisive innovations' in the eighteenth century; i.e, that the result does not reveal the ex ante probability of England's winning the race, the result would only be one of a distribution which we can conceptualise but never observe.
An It was further pointed out that it is important whether the industrial revolution is thought of as the result of a deterministic or a stochastic process. If the latter position is adopted then the question 'why was England first?' is misconceived insofar as the observed result need not imply that there was anything superior about the English economy, (proposition 2 above). The question 'why was the industrial revolution begun in the eighteenth century?' may still be useful in the sense that ex ante in, say, 1700 it might be argued that the probability of the 'decisive innovations' being made somewhere was high enough that the cumulative probability of their occurring before, say, 1800 was virtually 1, but even then the precise timing would be of no very great significance.
To clarify these arguments and to gain some idea of their possible relevance the next section looks at theories of inventive activity and innovation in eighteenth century England and France.
IV.
There are, of course, a wide range of hypotheses purporting to 'explain' inventive activity. At one extreme is the 'great man' approach.
In Usher's words this holds that "The novelties that constitute the basis of social growth and development are attributed to the inspiration of genius ... Such avenues to truth and social change do not admit of explanation or analysis."(30)
For an economist this would normally be characterised as an 'autonomous supply' argument; it can presumably be taken either as deterministic, of a large number of multiples in scientific discovery in general, which has led to the widespread abandonment of the notion that particular individuals are necessary to particular inventions, and the simplicity of the 'decisive innovations'. As Lilley puts it, "This is not a story of sophisticated inventions breaking through some technological barrier, and so creating the conditions for expansion. Developments that were technically so simple can only be responses to social and economic conditions that offered widening(34) opportunities for self advancement through innovation.
Economic inducements are represented by the hypotheses that the 'decisive innovations' were the result of the greater pressure of the growth of demand and 'factor scarcities' in England than on the continent.
Thus Habakkuk maintains that "Most of the economically important inventions of the Industrial Revolution period can more plausibly be ascribed to the pressure of increasing demand than to the random operation of the human instinct of contrivance, changes in factor prices, or the Schumpeterian innovator ... Both in the primary iron industry and in cotton there were exceptionally strong stimuli to the adoption of new methods: in the former, shortage of timber and the consequent dependence on foreign supplies for a large part of a munition of war, wrought iron; in the latter the lack of balance between the spinning and weaving sections ... These seems to me the main reaons why the Industrial Revolution hap $en@d in England rather than in for example, France."`3 5)
Other authors have disagreed and emphasised a superior response to economic stimuli; for example, Rostow argues that "What distinguished Britain from the rest as the eighteenth century wore on was the scale of the inventive effort that went into the breaking of crucial technical bottlenecks, and the scale of the entrepreneurial corps which introduced them as the century moved towards its close."(36).
In the promotion of a vigorous response writers such as McClelland (37) have stressed sociological factors, whilst others such as Musson and Robinson (38) emphasise the role of science.
However, if the socio-economic theories are regarded as deterministic and examined as to their ability to cope with all the events in the eighteenth century innovation they appear to be far from satisfactory.
Musson has recently mounted a strong critique from this perspective.
He suggests that such theories "... completely [ignore] the realities of individual achievement, sustained effort, and the mixture of motives involved." (39) and continues, with reference to a number of eighteenth century improvements, "If these inventions were simply products of pressing economic and social forces, why was there such a long time lag before their widespread application? Surely, if they were sociologically or economically 'determined', 'inevitable' and 'necessary', they should have been brought into widespread use immediately." (40) Similarly it is hard not to sympathise with the point of the following quotation from Hook; Indeed we find a foremost authority in the area expressing "... the extreme agnosticism to which one is led on the subject of technological change by recent theorising." (43) As far as economic theory is concerned it is in fact difficult using neoclassical assumptions to derive predictions about the rate of technological 
it is useful neither for explaining the rate of innovation nor the role of 'shortages' in promoting the first appearance of particular resource/ factor saving innovations in England rather than France, say.
However, if we look closely amongst all this apparent chaos in the literature the situation may not be quite as unpromising as the preceding review suggests at first sight.
There is in fact some agreement among many authors who hold such apparently widely divergent views. That is to say they all treat technological progress as a stochastic process.
The writers concerned can all be interpreted as sharing a vision of innovations emerging from a search process which is highly uncertain in terms both of the nature and timing of its outcome and which is conditioned as to its intensity and direction by social and economic variables and as to its chances of making particular discoveries by scientific knowledge and existing technology.
Thus we find Musson in his stern criticism of existing theories related to the 'decisive innovations' arguing on the one hand that "There seems little doubt ... innovators or entrepreneurs were certainly very much influenced by economic factors, such as relative factor ,(50) prices, prices, market possibilities, and profit prospects. 0n the other hand he remarks" ".., there is danger of easy historical hindsights: we know that certain inventions were made during the Industrial Revolution, and it is easy to produce arguments as to their 'inevitability', though they certainly did not seem 'inevitable' to the contemporaries concerned." (51) and that "... if one studies at first-hand the detailed contemporary evidence -revealing the prolonged thought, experiments, disappointments, and innumerable practical problems involved in producing an invention, from the first original idea to eventual industrial application, not forgetting also the countless failures and bankruptices -then a theory of 'inevitability' appears ludicrous ..."(52) Yet, if we examine the modern version of the 'sociological determinism', about which Musson is so scathing, we find it is actually a probabilistic theory apparently not so very antagonistic to Musson in the second half of the nineteenth century." 5b
Elsewhere he argues that "... the developed countries never solve more than a small fraction of the problems which happen to be formulated and actively pursued." ( 57) In the historical context we have been examining we find a statment of similar sentiment from Landes, "From the 1730's on British forgemasters devoted great effort and expense to finding a shorter, surer technique [of making wrought iron] that would use mineral rather than vegetable fuel.
The search took half a century ." (58) Many more examples could be given of similar positions being If the firm's rate of return on capital exceeds a target level, the firm retains it with probability one.
Otherwise a probabilistic search process generates a possible alternative technique.
The probability distribution governing search outcomes is constructed in a manner that reflects the influence of 'closeness' and of 'imitation' ... Finally a test is applied to determine if the technique turned up by the search process is actually less costly, at the prevailing wage rate, than the one the firm currently uses.
If the answer is yes, the firm changes technique." (59) The authors point out that unlike neoclassical theories "... there was no production function -only a set of physically possible activities ... The exploration of the set was treated as an historical incremental process ..." (60) in this model. (ii) How has the superiority inference been justified?
The answer to the first of these questions would seem to be a resounding no.
In fact the theme of similarities between the French and England economies has been one which from time to time has found a number of friends.
For example, Nef, writing in the 1940's says, "According to the popular misconception, English, or at any rate British, industrial development was in sharp contrast to Continental throughout the eighteenth century, and not simply at the very end of it. But, as we shall see, the rate of industrial change from about 1735 to 1785 was no more rapid in Great Britain than in France, a far larger country with nearly three times as many people. What is striking in eighteenth century economic history is less the contrasts than the resemblances between Great Britain and the Continent, both in the rate of economic development and in the directions that development was taking." ( 65) A rather similar chord has been struck by Rostow in his recent work. His comment on the figures reproduced here as Table 1 is that, "There is ... some ambiguity about why Britain and (66) not France was the first nation to move into take-off." One is put in mind of Gerschenkron's comment on Rostow; "The question was what made growth start. Rostow would answer that it did so because the preconditions were completed.
When one asked how this was known, the further answer was that growth had started." (75) Not surprisingly in the circumstances we find vigorous disagreement VI.
It remains to point out a couple of things this paper is not striving to maintain. First it is not arguing that the industrial revolution in England was an entirely fortuitous event.
Second it is not arguing that the French economy was more likely than the English to have an industrial revolution in the eighteenth century, simple that the English economy, or particular features of it, is not proven to be superior in that regard. Essentially the warning the paper seeks to
give is against expecting too much from comparative economic history.
Whilst Landes argues that, "... if history is the laboratory of the social sciences, the economic evolution of Europe should provide the data for some rewarding experiments," (89) it is unfortunately the case that some of the uncontrolled experiments history performed were unique, non repeatable events. 
Ibid., pp.63-65.
(15) Despite the very high proportional growth rates attained by the cotton textiles sector in late eighteenth century Britain, it is nonetheless true that the sector accounted for only a small fraction of value added in the economy as a whole. 
